countries IBM operates wholesale-trade outlets, which do no meaningful manufacturing but instead import and distribute goods produced elsewhere. 1 In this paper we revisit the question of why multinationals go abroad. To date most research has focused on two answers: to gain access to hostcountry markets or to exploit international factor-cost differences. Most empirical research has concluded that market-seeking FDI matters more than FDI motivated by wage differentials. In contrast we will document multinational expansion strategies that have received little attention in the literature. We then analyze how host-country policies and market conditions shape these various strategies. Finally, we examine whether existing theories of multinationals help explain the patterns we uncover.
The starting point for our analysis is the large academic literature on why multinationals exist and how they affect host markets. A firm becomes multinational when through FDI it establishes in two or more countries business enterprises in which it exercises some minimum level of ownership control. Over the last two decades, there has been rapid progress in modeling multinational firms in general equilibrium. This theoretical literature contains mostly unidimensional theories of multinationals, which focus on either horizontal or vertical FDI. 2 The vertical-FDI view is that multinationals arise to take advantage of international factor-price differences. 3 Firms engage in two activities: headquarters services (for example, R&D and advertising) and production. Headquarters services are intensive in physical or human capital, while production is intensive in manual labor. When factor prices differ across countries, firms become multinational by locating production in countries where manual-labor costs are low and headquarters in countries where skilled-labor costs are low.
The horizontal-FDI view is that multinationals arise because trade barriers make exporting costly. 4 The formal setup is one in which firms have a highfixed-cost headquarters and one or more production plants. When trade costs are low, a firm produces all output in domestic plants and serves foreign con-
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Brookings Trade Forum: 2001 sumers through exports. When trade costs are high, a firm becomes multinational by building production plants both at home and abroad, each serving just that country's consumers. This type of FDI is called horizontal because the multinational does the same activities (here, production) in all countries. These two views of multinationals have much in common. In each case, multinationals arise to avoid duplicating headquarters activities. They also raise world welfare by making global production more efficient. The two views differ, however, in how FDI affects factor incomes within and across countries. If FDI is vertical, then multinationals may reduce absolute wage differences across countries and alter relative wages within countries. If FDI is horizontal, multinationals may raise income in each country without necessarily changing its distribution.
Recent academic empirical work tends to conclude that most real-world foreign direct investment is horizontal, not vertical. Consider these three findings. First, for decades most FDI flowed from large, rich countries to other large, rich countries. 5 That multinationals locate most production in similar, high-wage economies is consistent with FDI being driven more by market access than by wage differences. Second, sales by foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals are higher in countries with higher tariffs and transport costs on U.S. goods.
6 This is consistent with FDI motivated by market access. Third, U.S. firms serve foreign markets more through FDI and less through exports the larger is the scale of corporate operations relative to the scale of production. 7 This supports the idea that multinationals arise when scale economies in headquarter activities are strong relative to scale economies in production. 8 Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter 247 5. In a regression setting, Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) find that sales by affiliates of foreign multinationals in the United States or by foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals are higher for countries whose GDP is more similar to U.S. GDP. See also Markusen (1995) ; Lipsey (1999 Lipsey ( , 2001 .
6. Brainard (1997) ; Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) . 7. Brainard (1997) ; Yeaple (2001) . 8. Some representative statements on the predominance of horizontal FDI are Brainard (1997, p. 539 )-"The finding that rising per-worker income differentials reduce affiliate sales . . . [is] inconsistent with explanations of multinational activity that depend on factorproportion differences [that is, vertical FDI]"-and Markusen and Maskus (1999, abstract and p. 16 )-"Econometric tests give strong support to the horizontal model and overwhelmingly reject the vertical model . . . The [vertical] model should clearly not be taken seriously as a description of the world." But this conclusion is not universal. For example, Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001, p. 694 ) find evidence consistent with the "knowledge-capital" model of multinationals, which encompasses both horizontal and vertical FDI, "Results of our estimations are closely consistent with the [knowledge-capital] theory. . . . Both vertical and horizontal investments are important and related to country characteristics as the model predicts."
In this paper we challenge prevailing academic views about the relative importance of horizontal and vertical FDI. We do this by analyzing data that offer, relative to the recent literature, both more current and more detailed information on the foreign operations of U.S.-headquartered multinationals. The first novelty is timing. As we will show, FDI patterns in the 1990s were much richer than just the three findings discussed above. Previous research overlooked this richness partly because most of it excluded data from most of the 1990s, a period in which factors other than market access may have played a larger role in the strategies of U.S. multinationals. The second novelty is detail. We document and analyze foreign-affiliate roles that the literature often ignores: as export platforms that produce in but then sell outside host countries, as producers adding value to inputs outsourced from their U.S. parents, and as wholesalers distributing goods into foreign countries.
We have three main findings. First, there is strong evidence of vertical FDI. Overall, U.S. parents outsource a small but growing share of production to their foreign affiliates, in terms of exporting intermediate goods to affiliates for further processing. This share is substantial in specific regions and industries. Most of this activity is concentrated in North America and in various emerging economies. For example, imported inputs for further processing account for over 30 percent of affiliate sales for affiliates in Canada and Mexico. This activity is also concentrated in industries involving separable highskill and low-skill tasks: for example, over 20 percent of total sales for affiliates in electronics and transportation equipment, which were two of the three fastest-growing manufacturing industries in the 1990s.
Second, even where FDI looks to be horizontal, U.S. multinationals tailor their entry strategies-specifically, their destination of sales-to reflect hostcountry conditions. In larger, more-protected, and higher-tax economies, affiliates target most of their sales to the domestic market. But in smaller, less-protected, and lower-tax economies, U.S. multinationals set up export platforms that devote more of their sales to export markets in nearby regions and beyond.
Third, U.S. parents in manufacturing serve each foreign market either through affiliates that produce goods locally or through wholesale trade affiliates that resell goods produced elsewhere, but rarely through both means. Multinationals appear to face a decision between production-oriented and distribution-oriented FDI. This choice does not reflect the export-versus-FDI decision common to standard models in the literature, as that decision is only about alternative production modes. We offer some evidence that this pro-
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Brookings Trade Forum: 2001 duction-distribution choice turns partly on aspects of U.S. tax policy that give U.S. multinationals a strong incentive to keep these activities separate in each host country. Our findings suggest that viewing FDI as either horizontal or vertical partly misses the point. The data seem to show evidence of both types of FDI. The relative importance of motivations for FDI should, in theory, depend on crossindustry variation in production technology and factor intensity. It should also depend on cross-country variation in commercial policies, market size, and factor costs. Thus, for example, as relatively low-wage economies become both more open to FDI and larger in terms of their productive capacity, we expect more vertical FDI motivated by international differences in factor costs.
More broadly, our findings suggest that the literature's benchmark distinction between horizontal and vertical foreign direct investment does not capture the range of strategies that multinationals use. Conditional on choosing to become a multinational, a firm appears to face three overlapping choices about its global operations. First, should the foreign affiliate produce goods itself or should it distribute goods produced elsewhere? Second, for cases where the multinational chooses production-oriented FDI, should the affiliate be vertically integrated or vertically specialized? Vertically integrated affiliates can be stand-alone operations, but vertically specialized affiliates are presumably linked into the multinational's outsourcing network.
9 Third, should an affiliate sell goods locally or export goods to other markets? This third choice is faced by all affiliates, be they production-oriented of either variety or distribution-oriented.
A key motivation for distinguishing different modes of FDI is to identify how specific multinational expansion strategies respond to government policy. Previous research has focused on how trade and tax policies affect aggregate FDI. 10 Our research finds that trade and tax policies are very important not just in terms of aggregate affiliate activity but also in terms of the mix of affiliate expansion strategies.
Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter 249 9. We broadly define outsourcing as the process by which firms move certain production activities either geographically or outside the firm to an arm's-length supplier. For a detailed discussion see Feenstra and Hanson (2001) .
10. For a survey of research on the sensitivity of FDI to host-country tax policy, see Hines (1997) . Most studies find that inward and outward U.S. FDI is increasing in the after-tax rate of return, with an estimated elasticity of approximately unity. For recent treatment of the issue, see Hines (2001) .
For the remainder of the paper, we describe the foreign operations of U.S. multinationals, examine the use of foreign affiliates as export platforms, address outsourcing by U.S. parents to their foreign affiliates, and consider the choice between production-oriented and distribution-oriented FDI.
Regional and Industrial Patterns of FDI: An Initial Look
The data we use on multinationals are for majority-owned, nonbank affiliates of U.S.-headquartered corporations, as tracked by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The data appendix describes these data in detail.
11
To start our analysis, tables 1 and 2 show the distribution of affiliates, sales, value added, employment, and capital stock for majority-owned affiliates of U.S. parent companies across countries and industries, respectively, for three years, 1982, 1989, and 1998 . Dollar-denominated data are in real 1998 dollars (see appendix for details). A number of clear patterns are evident in the data.
In table 1, looking at the location of U.S.-owned foreign affiliates in the cross-section shows that U.S. multinationals concentrate their operations in other high-income countries. In 1998, 76.6 percent of sales and 78.7 percent of value added by U.S. foreign-owned affiliates occurred in other OECD countries. As discussed earlier in this paper, this pattern is broadly consistent with U.S. multinationals engaging primarily in horizontal FDI. So too is the pattern of change over the full 1982-98 period, during which affiliate production and sales grew even more concentrated in the OECD.
The difference in affiliate behavior between the 1980s and 1990s, however, suggests a much different story. The rising concentration of affiliate activities in high-income countries occurred entirely in the 1980s, and it resulted less from growth in the OECD than from contraction elsewhere. From 1982 to 1989, worldwide affiliate employment was stagnant, rising by only 100,000 workers as employment growth in the OECD slightly offset declines in all other regions, except non-OECD Asia.
It helps to recall that in the 1980s, many non-OECD countries faced severe economic obstacles. Latin America's debt crisis and macroeconomic insta- (2.4 percent) . This 1990s reversal of concentration of affiliate activity in high-income countries appears in table 1 not just in employment but in the other four activity measures as well. That U.S. multinationals were shifting activities toward lowincome countries could be consistent with vertical FDI where factor-cost differences drive location decisions. But it could also be consistent with horizontal FDI, since many of these countries were enjoying rapid growth in market size. 14 We next examine affiliate operations along industry lines. Table 2 shows the share of total affiliate activities by major industry and year. 15 In all years manufacturing is the largest single industry, accounting in 1998 for 57.6 percent of total employment and 47.0 percent of total sales. Within manufacturing there are traditional industries, such as food products (mainly beverage and mill products), chemicals, and transportation equipment. There are also hightech industries, such as industrial machinery (mainly computers and office equipment) and electronics.
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13. Throughout the 1980s, China maintained severe restrictions on the activities of multinational firms (Naughton, 1996) . In 1992 the government began to allow multinationals to sell goods on the domestic market more freely, lift nontariff barriers and price controls on imports, and free exporters from having to sell their goods abroad through state-controlled foreign trade corporations.
14. Shatz and Venables (2000) document a similar shift in the 1990s worldwide, not just from the United States.
15. Here, "major industry" refers to the major headings in table 2 (that is, petroleum, manufacturing, wholesale trade, FIRE, services, and other industries), which are loosely based on the divisions of the 1987 U.S. Standard Industrial Classification. Outside of manufacturing there has been a substantial shift away from petroleum, whose share of total affiliate sales declined from 36.5 percent in 1982 to 11.5 percent in 1998. There has been a commensurate expansion in the FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) industries and services, whose share of sales increased over the 1982-98 period from 3.2 percent to 7.2 percent and from 2.5 percent to 6.7 percent, respectively. It is also noteworthy that by 1998, 20.7 percent of foreign sales by U.S. affiliates were in wholesale trade. That wholesale affiliates are responsible for a sizable fraction of affiliate sales by U.S. multinationals suggests that distribution activities, such as marketing or after-sales service, may be an important part of multinationals'global operations.
Reading tables 1 and 2 together, one can also see how the expansion of affiliate activities varies across both industries and regions. For the full sample period of 1982-98, the most dynamic sectors are FIRE and services, which have high sales and employment growth in all regions except Africa and the Middle East. High growth somewhat overstates the absolute importance of these sectors, however, as by 1998 they still accounted for less than onefifth of total affiliate operations. In manufacturing, worldwide affiliate sales grew 5 percent annually, with the most rapid growth occurring in non-OECD Asian countries. Petroleum shows (in numbers not reported) declining activity across all regions, but for slight capital-stock growth.
Combining an industry and region perspective, it is interesting to compare the input sources of output growth in manufacturing for OECD and non-OECD countries. In the OECD the growth rate of capital stock is comparable to that of sales, but employment growth is much less. U.S. manufacturing affiliates in high-income countries seem to have expanded more through accumulating capital and enhancing production efficiency than through increasing employment (as has also occurred in the United States). In contrast manufacturing affiliates in low-income regions like Latin America and non-OECD Asia have much higher employment growth relative to capital-stock growth. This OECD-non-OECD difference in input mix is consistent with multinationals using more labor-intensive production techniques in lower-wage countries, a pattern suggesting these firms do respond to international factor-price differences.
Looking at all industry-region combinations (not reported, for brevity), the single most dynamic combination is industrial machinery in non-OECD Asia. A large fraction of industrial machinery is computers and office equipment (both parts-components and finished goods). 16 Rapid growth both in this 254 Brookings Trade Forum: 2001 sector in Asia and also-as we will show later in this paper-for exports beyond the local market suggests that much recent FDI here has been vertical in nature. In sum tables 1 and 2 paint a richer picture of multinational activity than the literature commonly presumes. The continued high share of overall activity in OECD countries masks a noticeable move away from this concentration in the 1990s; wholesale trade affiliates are a sizable share of overall activity; and certain industries and regions display input and output growth suggestive of vertical as well as horizontal FDI. We now turn to analyzing elements of this picture in more detail.
Foreign Affiliates as Export Platforms
As outlined earlier, the dominant view in the trade literature is that foreign direct investment is primarily horizontal in nature: that is, that FDI by U.S. multinationals largely serves host-country markets by replicating abroad what these firms do at home. Here FDI is not motivated by international factor-cost differences between countries, but rather by the combination of fixed costs in headquarters services and trade costs in shipping goods internationally.
In standard models of horizontal FDI, affiliate sales stay exclusively in the host countries. But is this true in reality? In this section we present empirical evidence that challenges the presumption that foreign affiliates in all industries and countries are oriented mainly toward selling into their host markets. We first document that many foreign affiliates act as export platforms, serving regional and international markets. We then use econometric techniques to uncover what forces drive the choice for foreign affiliates between local sales and exports. Table 3 shows the fraction of exports in total sales for foreign affiliates by region for three years (1982, 1989, 1998) .
Affiliate Exports and Local Sales
17 Across all countries, exports account for about one-third of total affiliate sales, with this fraction being Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter 255 17. The complement of exports in total sales is same-country or local sales. These local sales are defined by whether or not the entity to which an affiliate sells a good resides in the same country as the affiliate. These entities can, of course, turn around and export their purchased goods to foreign markets. Given that such second-party exports are not captured in the data, the measured ratio of affiliate exports to total sales is a lower bound for the true value. quite stable over time. This aggregate stability, however, hides considerable variation across regions and over time.
The geographic orientation of sales appears to be sensitive to trade policies. The export-to-sales ratio rose dramatically in Mexico after its trade and investment reforms in the mid-1980s; in China, after its trade and investment reforms in the early 1990s; and in Canada, after its investment reforms of the mid-1980s and the United States-Canada free trade agreement in 1989. In contrast the export fraction of sales is much lower in regions with relatively high trade barriers, for example, other Asia and Pacific (mainly India).
Simple geography seems to matter, too. Exports are a lower fraction of total sales in some relatively isolated regions, for example, OECD Asia and the Pacific (Japan, Australia, and New Zealand). Yet the export-to-sales ratio in East Asia is higher than that in all other regions in 1998. Its fall over time reflects divergent trends between the relatively large and rich Asian tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan), which have falling ratios, and newly emerging Asian economies (Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand), which have rising ratios.
18 Table 4 shows export-to-sales ratios by industry. One noticeable difference here is between manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. In all four major nonmanufacturing sectors shown-petroleum, wholesale trade, FIRE, and services-exports as a share of total sales are actually falling over the sample period. By 1998 in all these sectors this share is at or below the all-
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Brookings Trade Forum: 2001 18. An additional factor that may have lowered the export to sales ratio for foreign affiliates in the Asian Tigers is that in 1988 the U.S. government removed these countries' eligibility for duty-free trade status under the Generalized System of Preferences. industry share. In contrast in manufacturing a rising share of affiliate sales are for export, over 44 percent by 1998. Within manufacturing, the export-tosales ratios are highest and have risen the most sharply over time in the industries commonly associated with outsourcing: computers and office equipment, electronic equipment, and transportation equipment. These three industries account for about 25 percent of total affiliate sales and employment (table 2) , and, as discussed earlier, these are also some of the industries in which U.S. multinationals have most aggressively expanded operations in emerging economies. The evidence in tables 3 and 4 on the destination of sales shows considerable diversity in the operations of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals. Most sales are for the local market in services and in countries that are large, rich, or have high trade costs. But most sales are for export in equipment industries commonly associated with outsourcing, with the strongest shift toward exports in countries in North America and Asia that have opened their markets to trade and investment. These patterns suggest multinationals systematically orient affiliate sales based on various industry and country charGordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter 257 acteristics. We now turn to a more formal examination of what forces shape the export versus local-sales decision of U.S. multinationals.
The Export versus Local-Sales Decision
In the empirical literature on multinationals, many studies treat all output by foreign affiliates in a country as destined for the local market and then examine which country and industry characteristics are correlated with affiliate total sales. 19 The typical set of regressors includes host-country incometax rates; host-country distance from the United States; industry average scale and skill intensity; and country-industry tariffs and transport costs. Regressions are estimated on data aggregated over affiliates by industry and country.
20
The main findings in this literature are that affiliate sales are increasing in country GDP, per capita GDP (or average education), tariffs, and industry skill intensity, and decreasing in average plant size. Brainard interprets these results to mean that FDI is higher where markets are larger, trade costs are higher, and scale economies at the plant are weaker, all of which are consistent with theories of horizontal FDI. 21 The positive correlation between affiliate sales and per capita GDP is sometimes seen as evidence against vertical FDI.
22
We use the standard estimating equations from the literature to ask a different set of questions. Rather than examining how country and industry characteristics influence total affiliate sales, we examine how these factors influence affiliate exports relative to affiliate local sales. We estimate the following specification using data over time (t) at the country (j) and industry (i) level for foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals. 20. Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (1999) use data aggregated to the country level, but their approach is similar in spirit to the country-industry analysis of Brainard (1997) .
21. Brainard (1997) . 22. Other results contradict this view. Yeaple (2001) finds that the impact of country average education on affiliate sales is weaker for less-skill-intensive industries, which suggests that multinationals in less-skill-intensive industries prefer less-skill-abundant countries. Relatedly, Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) find that for data at the country level, affiliate sales are higher the larger is the difference in the relative supply of skilled labor between the source and host country for FDI. This suggests that, all else equal, FDI tends to flow from more-skillabundant to less-skill-abundant countries.
where AEX ijt :exports by affiliates ALS ijt : local sales by affiliates The next two regressors are country GDP and per capita GDP. ENG j : dummy variable for whether the country is English speaking DST j : country distance to the United States TAX jt : the country effective corporate income-tax rate, defined such that higher values mean lower tax rates SKL it : the ratio of college-educated workers to high-school-educated workers for the industry in the United States SCL it : average employment for affiliates in the industry TC ijt : average freight cost for the country and industry TAR ijt : the average tariff rate for the country and industry NTB ijt : a dummy variable indicating the presence of nontariff barriers in the country and industry.
The last three regressors are available for manufacturing industries only. See the data appendix for details on these and other variables. The specification in equation (1) captures the differential impact of country and industry characteristics on affiliate exports relative to affiliate local sales. Since the dependent variable is the log difference between affiliate exports and affiliate local sales, we implicitly control for any unobserved variables which affect affiliate exports and local sales in the same manner.
23
This allows us to examine which factors induce affiliates to shift away from local sales and toward exports. In using an off-the-shelf empirical methodology, we refrain from commenting on whether the reduced-form specifications used in the literature are the best way to test general-equilibrium trade models. We focus, instead, on whether interpretations of results in the literature miss anything by not distinguishing between affiliate exports and affiliate local-market sales.
24
Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter 259 We estimate equation (1) on a sample spanning twelve two-digit industries, which include manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors; fifty-eight countries; and two years, 1989 and 1994. 25 All regressions include time and sectoral dummy variables. Table 5 reports the results. The first three columns include all sectors, and so exclude tariffs, NTBs, and transport costs as regres-
260

Brookings Trade Forum: 2001
between local sales and exports. Our work also follows the lead of Markusen and Maskus (2001) , albeit at the country and industry level rather than the country level only. For other work on exports by foreign affiliates of multinationals, see Shatz (2000) and Shatz and Venables (2000) . 25. Note that our estimation sample does not have to exclude observations which would require BEA data suppression. That said, there are many country-industry combinations in which U.S. multinationals are not present. We could enhance the efficiency and perhaps the consistency of the estimation by including data on these observations, for which affiliate sales are zero. The "first-difference" approach we take in constructing our regressand for equation (1) complicates including data on these zero observations in the estimation. Source: Authors' calculations using data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. See data appendix for details. Notes: Cell entries are OLS parameter estimates (and standard errors) for equation (1) . Each column reports a different specification, using as the regressand the variable reported at the top of each column. Columns 1, 2, and 3 cover all industries. Columnssors. The last two columns cover affiliates in manufacturing only, and so include these variables.
To start with specifications more similar to those of earlier studies, in column (1) of table 5 we report results using as the dependent variable log affiliate exports (rather than the dependent variable shown in equation (1)). We see that affiliate exports are higher in countries that have larger markets, higher average incomes, lower tax rates, an English-speaking population, and closer proximity to the United States. Column (2) uses as the dependent variable log affiliate local sales. The same qualitative correlations hold here as well. None of these results are surprising, and they are mostly consistent with previous research on affiliate total sales.
What is interesting is to compare the results in columns (1) and (2) to those in column (3), in which the dependent variable is the log difference between affiliate exports and affiliate local sales, as given in equation (1). The regression coefficients, then, show the correlation between affiliate exports and country-industry characteristics holding constant affiliate local sales.
In column (3) the coefficient on GDP is significantly negative, whereas it is positive in columns (1) and (2). This indicates that local sales are more attractive in larger markets, but in smaller markets affiliates are oriented toward exports more than local sales. The coefficient on per capita GDP remains significantly positive, indicating that sales are directed more toward exports in high-productivity countries. The coefficient on corporate taxes remains positive and statistically significant. That affiliates export more of their output the lower are taxes suggests that low taxes induce affiliates to become export platforms. 26 This may reflect a desire of U.S. multinationals to concentrate their production for a given region in low-tax countries. Wheeler and Mody, Brainard, and others fail to find a robustly significant correlation between affiliate total activity and tax rates. 27 This may be due, in part, to the fact that these studies do not differentiate between where affiliate goods Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter 261 26. Our sample of countries includes tax havens, which are mostly small economies with very low tax rates that attract large numbers of multinationals (Hines and Rice, 1994) . One might be concerned that exports by foreign affiliates in tax havens may be fictitious. A multinational might transfer ownership of goods to a foreign affiliate in a tax haven, which then transfers ownership on to the final destination, with or without the goods physically passing through the country. Shipping exports through tax havens could allow firms to avoid taxes through transfer pricing or other activities. To control for this possibility, we estimated the regressions in table 5 with tax havens excluded from the sample and found no impact on the results.
27. Wheeler and Mody (1992) , Brainard (1997) . It is important to note, however, that there is a large public-finance literature on the impact of host-country taxes on FDI. See Hines (1997) for a survey; other works include the edited volumes Feldstein, Hines, and Hubbard (1995) and Hines (2001). are sold. Interestingly in column (3) the coefficients on distance and the English dummy variable are not statistically different from zero. Proximity to or linguistic similarity with the United States do not seem conducive to foreign affiliates being export platforms.
Moving on to industry characteristics, table 5 shows that while there is a weakly positive correlation between industry skill intensity and total affiliate exports in column (1), there is a negative correlation between skill intensity and the ratio of affiliate exports to affiliate local sales in column (3) . This suggests that overall affiliate activity may be higher in skill-intensive industries, but that export platforms concentrate in less skill-intensive industries. We find no strong correlations for industry scale, as proxied by average affiliate employment.
28
In columns (4) and (5) we limit the sample to manufacturing industries. Of particular interest here are data on trade costs. Higher tariffs, nontariff barriers, and transport costs are all associated with lower affiliate exports both in absolute terms and relative to local affiliate sales (significantly so in all cases but one). Brainard and Yeaple find that higher tariffs are associated with higher affiliate sales, suggesting that tariff-jumping is an important motivation for FDI. 29 Our results indicate that these results do not apply to export platforms. Instead, higher trade barriers seem to dissuade affiliates from exporting.
30
This may be because higher barriers provide affiliates with a captive local market, making local sales relatively attractive, or because higher barriers raise the cost of importing intermediate inputs, making goods produced by affiliates less competitive on the world market. 28. The (unreported) industry dummies indicate that export platforms are more prevalent in equipment industries, which include industrial machinery, electrical equipment, and transportation equipment. These sectors are commonly associated with outsourcing, a process which could entail use of export platforms.
29. Brainard (1997) and Yeaple (2001) . 30. Contrary to results in the literature, we find a negative correlation between trade barriers and affiliate activity. We discuss reasons for the difference in results later in this paper, in particular in footnote 38.
31. One concern might be that these results on trade barriers might be driven by particular countries. For example, affiliates in Canada and Mexico might be special thanks to factors such as NAFTA and the shared U.S. border; empirically, export sales are exceptionally large for, and account for an exceptionally large share of the total sales by, those affiliates. Our results were qualitatively unchanged to various sampling exclusions, however. For example, when we excluded Canadian and Mexican affiliates from our sample, the only change in sign or significance to the results in table 5 was for the coefficient on tariffs in column (4) to become insignificant.
Beyond these results for trade barriers, our other results in columns (4) and (5) broadly match those in columns (1) through (3) . One change of note is that in column (5) the coefficient on industry scale is positive, which suggests that within manufacturing export platforms are more prevalent in high-scaleeconomy industries. This is plausible, as stronger scale economies would raise the incentive to concentrate global production in fewer locations.
One other result of note is the important role being played by policy variables. In unreported results, to explain the ratio of exports to local sales for our manufacturing subsample we first included as regressors sector dummies, distance, and country variables. We then added to this specification the policy variables tax rates, tariffs, and nontariff barriers. Across these two specifications the adjusted R-squared rose from 0.37 to 0.52. This indicates that although the country and industry characteristics help explain some amount of the overall variation in the decision about exports versus local sales, this aspect of multinational behavior also depends importantly on country policy variables as well.
The Export versus Local-Sales Decision: Summary
Much of the previous research on multinational expansion estimates correlations between affiliate total sales and host-country characteristics, and then evaluates whether these estimates are consistent with horizontal or vertical foreign direct investment. Again, the common finding is that total affiliate sales are greater in countries that are larger, richer per capita, and more protected.
In this section we have analyzed whether the sensitivity of affiliate sales to host-country characteristics depends on the destination market for these sales. We find that it does. Foreign affiliates tend to be more oriented toward export markets when located in countries that are smaller, less protected, and less taxed. Our results counter the idea that FDI is primarily oriented toward jumping trade barriers, and suggest that tax and trade policies influence both the scale and type of operations that multinationals establish in a country. This impact of host-country policies on the structure of multinational activities has been missed in previous work, which tends to assume that multinationals perform the same functions in all countries.
Outsourcing and Vertical Specialization
Some of our findings in the previous section suggest that vertical FDI matters more than previous literature has presumed-for example, that the share of affiliate sales going for export is higher in industries like machinery, electronics, and transportation. But we can gain additional insight on the production patterns of FDI by switching focus from affiliate outputs to affiliate inputs. The BEA data report total affiliate imports from their parents, and then disaggregate these imports into goods for resale, goods for further processing, capital goods, and other imports. Affiliate imports of goods for further processing are direct evidence of one kind of outsourcing, in which U.S. parents provide inputs for their foreign affiliates for additional processing.
32
Previous research has not made use of the BEA's outsourcing data. 33 In this section we examine these data to learn more about multinational expansion strategies. Table 6 reports the ratio of affiliate imports of goods for further processing to affiliate total sales by industry and by various regions. We limit the sample to manufacturing, since nonmanufacturing industries, by definition, do very little processing of physical inputs (imported or otherwise). In overall manufacturing, affiliate imports of goods for further processing have increased over time, from 9.8 percent of affiliate sales in 1982 to 12.2 percent of affiliate sales in 1994. But the aggregate shares mask considerable variation across industries and regions.
Outsourcing from Parents to Affiliates
Looking across industries, we see that outsourcing is most prevalent in industries that manufacture equipment. In 1994 the share of processing imports in sales is 23.2 percent in transportation equipment, 22.2 percent in electronics and electrical equipment, and 10.9 percent in industrial machinery (mainly computers and office equipment), compared to 0.1 percent in petroleum (not shown in table), 2.5 percent in food products, and 7.0 percent in 264 Brookings Trade Forum: 2001 32. Approximately 90-95 percent of imports from the United States by foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals are from parent firms. Even where the affiliate imports goods from an entity other than the parent, the parent may still have arranged the transaction. With this in mind, the measure of affiliate imports we use is all imports from the United States, including imports from parent and nonparent entities.
33. There is abundant empirical work on outsourcing from more-developed to lessdeveloped countries, which may or may not involve FDI. See Feenstra and Hanson (2001) for a survey of this literature. chemicals. At least two features of equipment manufacturing make it amenable to outsourcing. One is that it tends to involve production stagesdesign, component production, final assembly-that are physically separable. Firms need not perform these tasks in the same location, and so can locate different stages in different countries. Another feature is that production stages exhibit different factor intensities, with design activities being more skillintensive and assembly activities being more labor-intensive. To the extent that factor costs vary across countries, firms may want to locate labor-intensive activities in labor-abundant countries.
It is also evident in table 6 that the propensity of U.S. parents to outsource production to their affiliates varies greatly across regions. The share of processing imports in total sales is 33.5 percent in Canada, 36.7 percent in Mexico, and 14.3 percent in non-OECD Asia (with equipment industries having the highest incidence of outsourcing in all three regions). The magnitude of outsourcing to Canada and Mexico may reflect the importance of low trade costs in vertical FDI. As part of global outsourcing networks, multinationals may need to send large volumes of inputs back and forth between parent operations and affiliate plants. For U.S. firms, Canada and Mexico have both low transport costs and, as of the late 1980s, low tariffs and nontariff barriers. The magnitude of outsourcing to Asia may reflect the concentration of relatively low-wage, low-trade-barrier countries in the region. 34 Table 7 offers additional evidence suggesting the vertical specialization by foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals. For various industry aggregates in both 1982 and 1994, this table shows the ratio of value added to total sales both for foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals and, for comparison, for all establishments operating in the United States (as calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis). A higher ratio of value added to sales indicates that a business enterprise produces in-house a larger fraction of the inputs and outputs that compose its total sales. Value-added-to-sales ratios are generally lower for foreign affiliates than for U.S. establishments. This suggests that foreign affiliates specialize more in particular production stages than do compa-
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Brookings Trade Forum: 2001 34. Some companies report to the BEA that affiliate imports of goods for further processing accounts for more than 100 percent of total affiliate sales. This anomaly occurs because some affiliates, particularly those engaged in in-bond processing of goods (for example, maquiladoras in Mexico), do not include imports for further processing in their sales or expenses. Such cases are extremely rare. However: in 1994 there were only 67 cases like this out of a universe of 18,929 nonbank foreign affiliates. To correct for this problem in table 6, we replaced reported total sales with our best estimate of the true sales figure-that is, the sum of reported sales and imported goods for further processing. rable U.S. establishments, as would be consistent with vertical FDI.
35 Comparing 1982 with 1994, notice that while the value-added-to-sales ratios have been slightly rising for U.S. establishments, they have generally been falling for foreign affiliates. This suggests that foreign operations have become even more vertically specialized over time.
The Outsourcing Decision
Tables 6 and 7 show clear evidence of global outsourcing by U.S. multinationals, consistent with vertical foreign direct investment. This evidence raises an important question. Could estimation results on the relationship between affiliate total sales and country/industry characteristics, which have been interpreted as evidence in support of horizontal FDI and against vertical FDI, actually be summarizing country or industry characteristics associated Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter 267 35. It could be, of course, that foreign affiliates resell goods purchased from their parent firms and that this accounts for the low value added to sales ratios. In unreported results we find that foreign manufacturing affiliates of U.S. multinationals import very few goods for resale as a fraction of their total sales. (1), but in which we replace the dependent variable with either log affiliate imports for further processing or this variable minus log affiliate total sales. The regressors and the sample of observations are the same as in table 5, except that we restrict the set of industries to be from manufacturing. Table 8 reports our estimation results.
Columns (1) and (2) of table 8 shows regression results using as the dependent variable log affiliate imports for further processing and log total sales, respectively. Since affiliate imports are positively correlated with aggregate affiliate activity, it is not surprising that the coefficient estimates in columns (1) and (2) Source: Authors' calculations using data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. See data appendix for details. Notes: Cell entries are OLS parameter estimates (and standard errors) for a variation of equation (1) . Each column reports a different specification, using as the regressand the variable reported at the top of each column. Specifications include an unreported set of industry and year fixed effects. All variables are in logarithms except the dichotomous variables English-speaking and NTBs. See text for equation (1) and variable definitions. similar. Affiliate imports for further processing are higher in economies that are larger, have higher average incomes, are closer to the United States, have an English-speaking population, and have lower tax rates. They are also higher in industries that have lower transport costs to the United States and are more skill-intensive (in the United States). The same patterns hold for affiliate total sales. This suggests that vertical and overall FDI respond in a qualitatively similar manner to country and industry characteristics.
To gauge the differential sensitivity of vertical and overall foreign direct investment to these characteristics, we turn to the estimation results in column (3), in which we control for aggregate affiliate activity. The dependent variable is the log difference between affiliate imports for further processing and affiliate total sales. The regression coefficients show the correlation between affiliate processing imports and country-industry characteristics, holding constant total affiliate activities. The coefficients on total GDP and per capita GDP are now negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient on distance remains negative and the coefficient on industry scale remains positive. No other variables are statistically significant.
These results suggest that vertical FDI, as measured here by the fraction of total sales related to outsourcing, is greater in economies that are smaller, have lower labor productivity, and are closer to the United States. Smaller countries offer smaller markets and thus may make horizontal production for the local market less attractive, and so outsourcing is more attractive. That multinationals appear to outsource more to low-labor-productivity countries suggests that affiliate production related to outsourcing is more sensitive to labor costs than other types of affiliate production. The importance of distance from the United States to processing by affiliates is consistent with outsourcing requiring substantial back-and-forth movements of inputs (or managers) between parents and their foreign affiliates. Finally, the imprecisely estimated coefficient on tax rates in column (3)-as compared to the positive and precisely estimated coefficients in columns (1) and (2)-suggests that outsourcing is not more sensitive to taxes than are other multinational activities. In other words, vertical and horizontal FDI appear to have similar tax sensitivities.
36
In columns (4) and (5). we introduce controls for tariffs and nontariff barriers. Since we are missing observations on these variables for many industryGordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter 269 country combinations, their inclusion reduces the sample size. 37 In column (4) higher tariffs and NTBs are significantly correlated with lower levels of processing imports. This is to be expected. In column (5), however, the estimated coefficients on tariffs and NTBs are not significantly different from zero. This suggests that our measure of vertical FDI is not more sensitive to trade barriers (other than distance) than are other multinational activities. Since outsourcing may require back-and-forth shipments between parents and affiliates, we might expect trade barriers to have a strong negative impact on vertical FDI. One relevant fact here is that many countries give tariff breaks to foreign firms that process imported inputs for export. Such input-processing provisions allow a foreign affiliate in, say, Mexico to import inputs duty free from its parent in the United States, as long as the affiliate later exports the processed inputs in the form of a final product. So our observed trade barriers may be a poor indicator of the actual trade barriers that apply to global outsourcing by U.S. multinationals.
38
The Outsourcing Decision: Summary
In this section we have presented evidence of vertical FDI by U.S. multinationals. Both vertical and horizontal FDI appear to be higher in countries with larger markets, higher labor productivity, lower taxes, and closer proximity to the United States. However, when we hold constant the overall level of multinational sales in a country and industry, we find that outsourcing to foreign affiliates is higher in countries that have lower average labor productivity, smaller markets, and that are closer to the United States. The former result is important, as it contrasts with reported correlations between per capita GDP and affiliate sales, which have been taken as evidence against ver-
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37. Going from column (3) to column (5), we see that the coefficients on the dummy for an English-speaking population and on industry skill industry increase in magnitude substantially. Unreported results indicate that this is not the result of introducing controls for trade barriers but of restricting the sample to observations for which we have data on tariffs.
38. Two additional comments on the results in table 8. First, Brainard (1997) found a positive correlation between tariffs and affiliate total sales. This result may depend at least partly on differences in sample selection. We limit our sample to cases of nonzero observations on total sales, to allow our "differenced" dependent variables (see note 25). Second, as with our estimates in table 5, here again our results appear to be robust to various sampling exclusions. For example, Mexican affiliates may again be special here. Imports for further processing are exceptionally large for, and account for an exceptionally large share of total sales by, those affiliates. In addition, Mexico has relatively low labor productivity and shares a border with the United States. Despite all this, there were no changes to the sign or significance of our coefficient estimates for the sample excluding Mexico. tical FDI. 39 Among countries in which U.S. multinationals are present, outsourcing appears to be most common where labor productivity and average incomes are relatively low.
These findings suggest that to identify the impact of country (or industry) characteristics on multinational behavior, it is essential to distinguish between specific types of multinational operations, in this case outsourcing versus total sales. Aggregating over the activities of foreign affiliates may mask the presence of vertical FDI and give an incomplete picture of the range of operations that multinationals perform abroad.
Production-Oriented FDI versus Distribution-Oriented FDI
Much of the recent empirical work on multinationals focuses on the crosscountry configuration of production within manufacturing, with much effort devoted to understanding whether foreign-affiliate production in manufacturing is horizontal or vertical in nature. In the previous section, we reexamined data on manufacturing affiliates to argue that vertical foreign direct investment matters more than is commonly presumed. In this section, we broaden our focus beyond production-oriented FDI to consider distributionoriented FDI. Earlier in this paper (table 2), we documented that by 1998 foreign affiliates in wholesale trade accounted for over 20 percent of worldwide total sales by foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals. We now analyze in greater detail the characteristics of these distribution-oriented affiliates.
One reason wholesale affiliates matter is they belie the common assumption that U.S. firms serve foreign markets either through exports or through FDI. In most models of multinationals, when a firm exports goods the only cost of reaching foreign buyers is international shipping costs (covering both natural and political barriers). In reality, however, there may be substantial costs to delivering goods from foreign borders to foreign buyers, including clearance through customs, internal distribution and storage, marketing, repair, and so on. Sizable host-country distribution activities may induce exporting U.S. firms to establish foreign wholesaling affiliates-in which case these firms serve foreign markets through both exports and FDI. Another possibility is that manufacturing and wholesale-trade affiliates belong to different sets of parents involved in different sets of activities. All this suggests there are Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter 271 39. See Brainard (1997). merits to examining foreign distribution decisions and their links to foreign (and domestic) production decisions.
Facts about Wholesale-Trade Affiliates
We begin with the question, do individual U.S. multinationals engage in both production-oriented FDI and distribution-oriented FDI? Table 9 shows for U.S. parents in different primary industries, the share of total sales in foreign affiliates by primary industry of affiliates. All data are for 1998. To illustrate, of total sales by foreign affiliates of U.S. parents whose primary industry was electronic and electric equipment, 59.1 percent were by affiliates whose primary industry was also electronics, 28.1 percent were by affiliates whose primary industry was wholesale trade, and so on.
There are two key messages in table 9. First, most sales by foreign affiliates are in the same primary industry as that of their parents. While this might not seem surprising, these primary-industry sales shares are not as high as one might expect. For manufacturing they range from a high of 70.4 percent in food products to a low of 41.7 percent in industrial machinery. Second, for manufacturing parents the other major industry for sales by foreign affiliates is wholesale trade. The share of sales in wholesale-trade affiliates ranges from 9.7 percent for parents in transportation equipment to 37.7 percent for parents in industrial machinery. Thus table 9 suggests that many U.S. multinationals engage in both production-oriented and distribution-oriented FDI.
We now ask whether U.S. multinationals in a given country tend to choose either one form of FDI or the other. In unreported calculations on 1998 data, we found that to be overwhelmingly the case. There are few U.S. multinationals that operate both manufacturing and wholesale-trade affiliates in the same country. For example, in 1998 533 U.S. parents had manufacturing affiliates in Canada, 259 had wholesale-trade affiliates in Canada, sixty had both a manufacturing and a wholesale trade affiliate in Canada, and 732 had either a manufacturing or a wholesale trade affiliate in Canada-but not one of each in Canada. The Canadian case is typical. In most countries only about 10 percent of U.S. parents choose this strategy, with an even smaller share in the developing countries. So in a given country, U.S. multinationals choose either production-oriented FDI or distribution-oriented FDI, but not both. 40. Two additional comments on this result. First, one feature of the data which may make this result difficult to interpret is that U.S. parents vary greatly in the number of foreign affiliates they own. It may be that large multinationals, which account for a large fraction of total sales by foreign affiliates, have both manufacturing and wholesale trade affiliates, but that What might explain this either-or strategy of firms? It seems consistent with standard theories of horizontal FDI. In markets that are large and where trade costs vis-à-vis the United States are high, multinationals set up manufacturing affiliates; in contrast, in small, low-trade-cost markets, multinationals set up wholesale-trade affiliates to import and distribute goods produced elsewhere. The finding of the previous paragraph does not obviously support this hypothesis, however. Countries host affiliates in both manufacturing and wholesale trade, not just all one or all the other. 41 To the extent that U.S. firms face roughly the same host-country market conditions, that finding does not support a simple horizontal-FDI explanation. But we cannot rule it out completely, since exports can still flow without mediation by wholesalers.
A second explanation of this either-or strategy of U.S. multinationals might be a life-cycle story, in which one type of FDI leads the other. Perhaps initial uncertainty about host-market conditions and policies motivate U.S. firms to establish initially just wholesale-trade affiliates. These wholesalers can resell goods produced elsewhere and help firms gauge whether host countries merit larger-scale investments in manufacturing operations. If this lifecycle story of FDI were true, then we should see wholesale affiliates leading to manufacturing ones. 42 We examined this idea by tallying by industry the number of new manufacturing affiliates created by U.S. multinationals between 1990 and 1994. For each new manufacturing affiliate, we then asked whether its parent firm had 274
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small multinationals, purely by virtue of their size, have either one type or the other. This could give the false impression of a separation between production-oriented and storefront FDI. To gain insight into this issue, we examined how the fraction of countries in which a U.S. parent has both manufacturing and wholesale-trade affiliates varies with the number of countries in which the parent has affiliates. It is true that parents with more affiliates are in more countries and have a higher incidence of production-oriented and storefront investments in the same country. But in a given country even the largest parents tend to specialize in one activity or the other. Parents with affiliates in forty or more countries have both manufacturing and wholesale trade affiliates in just 16 percent of the countries in which they are present. A second comment is that this stark separation of activities between manufacturing and wholesaling does not result from diversified affiliates being forced into different primary industries by the data collectors. As explained in the data appendix, BEA does not allow foreign affiliates in the same country to be consolidated if they are in different primary industries unless they are integral parts of the same business operation. Moreover, the secondary activities of the affiliates that meet this exception are small. In 1998, for example, only 4 percent of the sales of manufacturing affiliates were in the secondary industry of wholesale trade, and only 3 percent of the sales of affiliates in wholesale-trade affiliates were in manufacturing.
41. Looking at all countries, we found that wholesale-trade affiliates were less prevalent in small or developing economies.
42. For a detailed discussion of life-cycle motives for FDI, see Moran (2001) .
a wholesale-trade affiliate in that country in 1989. We found that manufacturing births were preceded by wholesale affiliates in fewer than 10 percent of births in every industry, and in fewer than 6 percent of all manufacturing births that period. So in very few cases in which a parent established a manufacturing affiliate did it first establish a wholesale trade affiliate in the same country. This casts doubt on the life-cycle explanation.
43
A third reason why U.S. multinationals might choose to locate productionoriented and distribution-oriented affiliates in different countries relates to the U.S. tax treatment of foreign-source income. U.S. firms are taxed on a residence basis. This means that income that a U.S. corporation earns through its foreign affiliates, that is, its foreign-source income, is subject to U.S. taxation. If a U.S. corporation also pays foreign taxes on its foreign-source income, it is eligible for a foreign-income-tax credit. With the current top U.S. corporate income-tax rate of 35 percent, a U.S. corporation that earns foreign income in a country and pays foreign taxes equal to 20 percent of this income would owe the U.S. government a tax payment equal to 15 percent of its foreign earnings.
Under U.S. tax law, foreign-source earnings from manufacturing and wholesale-trade affiliates are subject to different tax treatment. "Active" foreign income by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, which includes most income earned by U.S. foreign manufacturing affiliates, is subject to U.S. taxation when firms repatriate the income to the United States. A U.S. firm may delay repatriation and so defer taxes by re-investing its foreign earnings in activities abroad that generate active income.
44 "Passive" foreign income, which includes some income from sales by wholesale-trade affiliates, is subject to immediate U.S. taxation.
45
To avoid having income from manufacturing activities lumped together with income from wholesale-trade activities, and so subject this active income to immediate U.S. taxation, a U.S. corporation must keep these activities conGordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter 275 43. An issue we did not address is whether there is a difference between the case where a manufacturing affiliate is created through a merger or acquisition and one in which it is created by greenfield investment. In the latter case, we might expect uncertainty about hostcountry conditions to be greater and so the incentive to test the market through establishing a wholesale trade affiliate to be higher. This is an interesting issue, but one we leave for future work.
44. To be eligible for tax deferral, the requirements include that the U.S. corporation own 10 percent of the affiliate in which it is investing and that the affiliate generates active income. For details, see Joint Committee on Taxation (1984), Hufbauer (1992) , Altshuler and Newlon (1993) , and Altshuler and Hubbard (2000) .
45. This tax treatment is due in part to changes in U.S. tax law resulting from the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which tightened up subpart F rules first created in 1962 meant to prevent abuse of tax-deferral provisions. fined to separate subsidiaries. In practice, as we have seen, U.S. multinationals tend to avoid having manufacturing affiliates and wholesale-trade affiliates in the same country. The incentive to separate wholesale and manufacturing activities would be stronger in lower-tax countries, since in these countries the U.S. tax liability (and so the potential tax deferral) on any amount of foreign income would be higher.
The Choice between Production-Oriented and Distribution-Oriented FDI
To gauge the importance of factors that influence the choice between production-oriented and distribution-oriented FDI, we now examine whether the scale of activity in wholesale-trade affiliates relative to manufacturing affiliates is systematically related to host-country characteristics and policies. In the previous sub-section we discussed three hypotheses for firm-level factors driving this choice. Theories of horizontal FDI suggest that this choice mirrors the export-versus-FDI decision, in which case production-oriented FDI should be more common in economies that are larger and have higher trade costs. The second hypothesis, the life-cycle story, has no obvious support in the data and we do not pursue it further. The third hypothesis, tax planning, is that the preference of U.S. multinationals for wholesale-trade activities over manufacturing activities will be stronger in higher-tax countries (again, since the benefits of deferring U.S. income taxes would be smaller on income earned in these countries).
We examine these hypotheses by regressing the ratio of sales by wholesaletrade affiliates to total sales by wholesale-trade and manufacturing affiliates on country GDP, per capita GDP, effective corporate tax rates, distance from the United States, and average transport costs. Our dependent variable, which captures the share of wholesale-trade affiliates in total "manufacturingrelated" sales in a country, is one measure of distribution-oriented FDI relative to production-oriented FDI.
Before turning to the estimation results, we note that our sample of countries includes tax havens. 46 These are countries with very low tax rates, in which multinationals sometimes locate corporate offices for the purposes of reporting income but not necessarily for the purposes of producing or selling goods locally. 47 The presence of tax havens may introduce noise into data on 276
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wholesale-trade activity. Multinationals may ship goods through affiliates in tax havens en route to a final destination, or may simply report goods as having been bought and sold by affiliates in tax havens to benefit from lower tax rates. Wholesale-trade activity by U.S. multinationals in tax havens may, then, be quite different from that in other countries. To control for this possibility, we report results both with and without affiliates in tax havens in the sample. Table 10 reports our results. Column (1) includes tax havens in the sample of countries. The share of wholesale-trade affiliates in total manufacturingrelated sales is lower in larger markets, higher in markets with higher average income, and lower in English-speaking countries. Coefficients on the other variables are imprecisely estimated. That relative sales by wholesale-trade affiliates is decreasing in country GDP is inconsistent with horizontal theories of FDI. The small and imprecisely estimated coefficient on tax rates suggests that tax policy does not matter. This coefficient estimate, however, may be influenced by tax-haven countries in the sample.
Column (2) excludes tax havens from the sample. Now relative sales by wholesale-trade affiliates are higher in countries with higher taxes, although this correlation is imprecisely estimated. This is consistent with tax considerations mattering as outlined above. U.S. multinationals seem to be (weakly) more oriented toward distribution-oriented FDI in higher-tax countries, in which the cost of exposing foreign-source income to immediate U.S. taxation Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter 277 Source: Authors' calculations using data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. See data appendix for details. Notes: Cell entries are OLS parameter estimates (and standard errors) for estimates of the equation presented in the section of this paper entitled "The Choice between Production-Oriented and Distribution-Oriented FDI," where the dependent variable is sales by wholesale trade affiliates as a share of those sales plus the sales of manufacturing affiliates. Column (1) includes in the sample tax-haven countries; column (2) is relatively low. Column (2) also shows that wholesale relative sales are increasing in distance to the United States. This is inconsistent with theories of horizontal FDI, which predict that multinationals favor serving remote countries via local production rather than exports (and export-related wholesale trade).
Distribution-Oriented FDI: Summary
In this section we have examined the wholesale-trade activities of U.S. multinationals. Previous research has focused on their manufacturing activities, both at home and abroad, which makes sense given the prominence of manufactured goods in international trade. But wholesale-trade affiliates constitute a sizable share of overall affiliate activity, and little is known about how their operations may interact with manufacturing operations. Our analysis suggests that distribution-oriented FDI displays features that seem inconsistent with standard theories of horizontal FDI. Instead, we found suggestive evidence that host-country tax policies influence the choice between distribution-oriented and production-oriented FDI.
Concluding Remarks
Over the last two decades, there has been a boom in academic research on foreign direct investment . Two important strands of this literature develop and test general-equilibrium models of multinational firms. Theoretical work tends to characterize multinationals as arising through either horizontal or vertical FDI. Empirical work tends to find strong support for horizontal FDI but not vertical FDI. These first-generation studies have been enormously helpful.
In this paper, we use recent, detailed data on U.S. multinationals to revisit why multinationals go abroad. We examine three types of multinational activities: global outsourcing, the use of export platforms, and wholesale trading. Our results suggest that vertical FDI is more common than previous work suggests, and more generally that affiliates span a diverse set of activities that each respond to host-country policies and characteristics in quite different ways.
We find clear evidence of vertical FDI. Earlier research tends to overlook data on trade within U.S. multinationals. U.S. parents actually outsource a substantial amount of production to their foreign affiliates. Though this vertical FDI is concentrated in particular regions and industries, it is clearly an 278
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important part of the overall picture. Previous work may have missed detecting vertical FDI due to the fact that outsourcing-and other activities by foreign affiliates-have similar patterns of correlation with host-country characteristics. Consistent with previous literature, we also find evidence that FDI is horizontal. But these activities are more varied than has been recognized. The standard view is that horizontal FDI is oriented toward producing goods exclusively for the host-country market. We find that foreign affiliates in certain industries and regions export the majority of goods that they sell. What is striking about these export platforms is that they predominate in smaller and lessprotected economies, where theory predicts that horizontal FDI should be least common. We also document the relatively high sensitivity of export platforms to taxes and trade barriers.
Finally, we find evidence of distribution-related FDI, which the trade literature has largely ignored. In standard models, the decision of a firm to become a multinational is typically cast as a production choice: between exporting to or producing in a foreign market. This distinction obscures FDI related to wholesale trade. Wholesale-trade affiliates account for 24 percent of sales by foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals in manufacturing. We find distribution-oriented FDI to be relatively concentrated in markets that are smaller and more distant from parent firms-markets in which standard theory suggests affiliates should be less oriented toward selling goods imported from abroad. We also document that firms tend to enter a given foreign market through either distribution-oriented FDI or production-oriented FDI, and we find preliminary evidence that tax policy, among other factors, helps shape this choice.
Recent research on horizontal FDI has been extremely useful in describing broad patterns of multinational behavior. However, this research misses important variations in the range of activities that multinationals perform and in the sensitivity of these activities to host-country policies and characteristics. We have tried to provide some initial evidence on this range of activities and on the role of policy. Future work should examine these issues in greater detail.
DATA A P P E N D I X
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Data
The data on the operations of foreign affiliates are from the tabulated results of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) surveys of U.S. direct investment abroad.
1 They are based on mandatory surveys conducted by BEA. Data are available annually from 1982-98, but the data for some years are more comprehensive than others, depending on the type of survey on which the data are based. Benchmark surveys (or censuses), which are currently conducted every five years, are the most comprehensive in two respects: (1) they cover virtually the entire population of foreign affiliates in terms of dollar value, and (2) they obtain more data items than are collected in the nonbenchmark surveys. The BEA maintains an annual time series for most data items by conducting sample surveys in the nonbenchmark years. Reports are not required for small affiliates in the sample surveys, in order to reduce the reporting burden on the U.S. companies that must file. Instead, BEA estimates the data for these affiliates by extrapolating forward their data from the most recent benchmark survey on the basis of the movement of the sample data. Thus coverage of the affiliate universe is comparable in benchmark and nonbenchmark periods. The data in this paper are from the 1982, 1989, and 1994 benchmark surveys and the 1998 sample survey.
A foreign affiliate is a foreign business enterprise in which there is U.S. direct investment; that is, it is a foreign business enterprise in which a U.S. legal entity (for example, business or individual) has a 10 percent equity stake. A majority-owned affiliate is a foreign business enterprise in which the U.S. entity has at least a 51 percent equity stake. Foreign affiliates are classified by two-digit and three-digit BEA International Surveys Industry codes that are closely related to two-digit and three-digit U.S. Standard Industrial Classification codes. A foreign affiliate generally represents the consolidation of the U.S. direct investor's business operations in a host country in a single threedigit industry. 2 In 1994, majority-owned affiliates accounted for 78 percent of total affiliate sales.
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The data used in this paper are from BEA's country-by-industry tabulations of selected data items for foreign affiliates. These tabulations provide data on a single aspect of affiliate operations for fifty-eight major host countries (grouped into five major regions), by twelve two-digit industries. To avoid the loss of data observations, the statistical analysis was performed on unsuppressed versions of the tabulated BEA data. 3 Comparison of the dollar-denominated measures of affiliate operations across countries and across time is subject to some measurement error related to valuation. The dollar-denominated measures are, for the most part, valued in the prices and exchange rates of the year covered by the data. Accordingly, changes in foreign-affiliate data over time may reflect changes in prices and exchange rates rather than real changes in affiliate operations. In addition, the accuracy of cross-country comparisons of foreign affiliate data may be affected if the market exchange rates used to translate foreign-affiliate data to U.S. dollars do not reflect the relative purchasing power of different currencies. Finally, data on the affiliate capital stock are valued at historical cost rather than current replacement cost. To improve the comparability of the dollar-denominated measures of affiliate operations across time in tables 1-3, rough estimates of their value in 1998 dollars were obtained by applying the U.S. GDP deflator to BEA's published current dollar estimates. 4 Because of potential limitations of our dollar-denominated measures, affiliate-activity measures in terms of employment may be more informative (for example, see the Regional and Industrial Pattern of FDI section of this paper).
Other Data
Our analysis combines the BEA data with a number of industry and country-varying characteristics. The trade-barrier variables include tariffs, nontariff barriers, distance, and transportation costs. Tariffs are from the United Nations' TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System) CD-ROM. The original source data are classified by country and by six-digit Harmonized Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter 281 System product codes. These data, plus a translation of them to a 1987 fourdigit U.S. SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) basis, were obtained from Jon Haveman. Aggregation of the data from a four-digit SIC basis to a twodigit BEA ISI (International Surveys Industry) basis was derived by weighting the disaggregated data by the value of U.S. exports of goods to the country. Data on nontariff barriers are also from TRAINS. The original source data for these were at the four-digit SIC level, which we then concorded to BEA industries as just described. The nontariff information is categorical, indicating presence or absence of a set of nontariff barriers. The transportation-cost data were generated from data files in Feenstra (1996) , which report for each industry in each year imports (in millions of dollars) in terms of both c.i.f.
(cost, insurance, and freight) values and customs value. 5 For each observation we constructed transportation costs (imports c.i.f. value minus imports customs value) as a share of the customs value of imports. The original source data are classified on a 1987 four-digit U.S. SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) basis; they were aggregated to a two-digit BEA ISI (International Surveys Industry) basis by weighting the disaggregated data by the value of total imports by the host country. All trade-barrier data are bilateral for the host country vis-à-vis the United States; all but distance also vary by industry as described.
Host-country data include information on market size, average productivity, and tax rates. Total market size and average productivity are measured by total and per capita GDP (at PPP exchange rates). These data come from the World Bank.
6 The tax-rate data are from the Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Division. They measure average effective tax rates faced by controlled foreign corporations of U.S. corporations. We obtained these data from Harry Grubert (see Grubert, 2001 ). Industry-varying data include average skill intensity in the United States; this is measured by the ratio of college educated workers to high-school educated workers, as calculated from U.S. Census Bureau data from data in Hanson and Slaughter (2001) .
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6. The World Bank's Development Indicators CD-ROM for 1982 , 1989 , 1994 plement to trade. Similarly, in such a world, horizontal FDI, motivated by the desire to skip over trade barriers, will become relatively less important. In addition, and of relevance to the policy debates I alluded to earlier, the paper implicitly makes the valuable point that even when on average they do not seem important, cost driven considerations can still be important at the margin. As the regression analysis shows, controlling for the overall level of affiliate sales, for example, the importance of export platforms and outsourcing is affected by relative costs. Indeed this result is quite similar to those obtained by Subi Rangan and me when we looked at the effects of exchange rate changes on U.S. multinational sourcing decisions. 4 Multinational affiliates by and large produce in the countries in which they are located. In developed countries, for example, the domestic share of value-added is typically around 90 percent.
5 But at the margin these shares are sensitive to relative costs, and cumulatively, adjustments of one or two percentage points can have a large impact on aggregate trade flows. Thus even if on average, the picture looks like the horizontal model, the issues raised by the vertical model cannot automatically be discounted.
The paper makes also makes a useful contribution in pointing to the importance of behavior that does not fit into a single mold explanation, such as exporting, outsourcing (from developed countries), and FDI investment in wholesale-trade affiliates. My comments will focus on the latter two motives.
It is noteworthy that the type of outsourcing considered in the paper is quite different from the traditional focus on outsourcing. Traditionally that discussion considers American parents outsourcing production to foreign affiliates typically because of lower foreign labor costs. But the outsourcing measure explained in this paper is "outsourcing" by affiliates, in terms of their reliance on value-added by their U.S. parents. The authors obtain the interesting result that the less developed the country, the greater the reliance by U.S. affiliates on value-added from the United States. This result is certainly amenable to interpretation as evidence in support of vertical outsourcing, but it would be driven by cheaper capital costs in the United States rather than cheaper labor costs in the developing countries. However, a second interpretation is that it reflects differences in technological capabilities. This is again consistent with a vertical FDI story but it has a more dynamic twist. The more technologically sophisticated the economy, the greater the reliance by U.S. multinationals on value-added in their affiliates.
This finding also has interesting implications for policy. In general, developing countries have tried to induce foreign affiliates to increase their local content (sometimes through official requirements) in order to enhance their economic development. This finding suggests, however, that there could be a reverse causation in which economic development leads to increased local content. 6 Finally, the paper makes a real contribution emphasizing different motivations for wholesale trade FDI. The rejection of the explanation based on a lifecycle view-in which firms first invest in wholesaling activities and later mature into local producers-is very interesting and points to the role for more work in explaining wholesale and production FDI as separate phenomena. It is certainly plausible that while production FDI will depend on relative manufacturing costs, distribution FDI will be driven by the benefits of holding large amounts of inventories locally and determinants of marketing costs. These considerations would lead one to expect more (relative) investment in wholesale foreign direct investment, the further the market is from the United States (which could require more inventories) and when the country does not speak English (which could require a distinctive marketing approach). Both of these expectations are supported by their results. More work in this area is warranted.
A last quibble. The authors claim that they also find "preliminary evidence" that tax policy helps determine the share of wholesale FDI. I disagree. The lack of statistical significance in their regression coefficients on the tax variable could actually be showing that taxes are unimportant.
James Levinsohn: This is a paper about why multinational corporations are in fact multinational. It is about why they go abroad in the first place. Having examined detailed industry-level data, the authors conclude that the answer is "it's complicated." The ways in which firms' decisions are complex, though, are illuminating and instructive.
Detailed data on U.S. multinationals have only recently become available to academic economists and the data remain somewhat difficult to access. This relative lack of disaggregated data did not stand in the way of modeling firms'
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Brookings Trade Forum: 2001 6. Manufacturing FDI by U.S. firms in developing countries has been growing more rapidly than FDI in developed countries. Thus a higher share of it will be relatively more recent. When Rangan and I obtained a result similar to that here, we were concerned that the per capita variable could actually be picking up a vintage effect. However, the result proved robust and we still found that local content was higher, the more developed the economy. See Rangan and Lawrence (1999). decisions to produce abroad. 1 Hence, without ever really having to think too hard about what firms actually do, there arose a voluminous literature modeling why firms produce abroad. Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (HMS) have looked at the disaggregated data, tried to relate their findings to the existing theoretical literature, and discovered an important disconnect. Like trying to assemble a jigsaw puzzle when the pieces are mistakenly from multiple puzzles and nothing fits, the data just do not mesh very easily into the theoretical framework that was developed in the data's absence.
Here is a simplification of how the theoretical literature models a firm's decision to perhaps go abroad. First, the firm decides between exporting and investing in the foreign country. When the latter takes place, the resulting foreign direct investment (FDI) is classified as either primarily vertical or primarily horizontal. Vertical FDI typically involves setting up a factory in the host country (where there is relatively more unskilled labor) and producing there while keeping headquarters activity in the parent country (where there is relatively more skilled labor). It is presumably believed that running a company is more skilled-labor intensive than producing the output. Horizontal FDI, on the other hand, tends to replicate in the host country the same basic structure that already exists in the parent country. In the horizontal-versusvertical view of FDI, horizontal FDI occurs because of trade barriers. Absent these barriers, firms would elect to simply export. Vertical foreign direct investment may take place even absent significant trade barriers since it is motivated by differential factor prices.
My comment focuses on four key results. With ten tables, most of which examine multiple regions, specifications, industries, and years, figuring out what the punchlines are is not a trivial exercise. My information processing capabilities are severely taxed with this paper. Either I need more RAM or the paper needs fewer and more distilled results. (I'm amenable to the former.) -Result 1. "The literature's benchmark distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI does not capture the range of strategies that multinationals use." This has to be right. We operate in a world in which Intel, for example, does R&D in both the United States and Israel, and produces in Costa Rica, California, and Asia. Some of these plants sell "locally" in their host country. Others ship their output to countries in which Intel does not produce, while Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter 287 still others send their output back to the United States. With all this happening, a simple view of FDI is going to miss a lot. I take two messages away from HMS's observation. First, we need models that are more in touch with the way firms operate in today's global business environment. For example, it is not even obvious that the export versus FDI decision is the right way to think about why firms go abroad. As HMS show, many firms become multinational not as an alternative to exporting but as an alternative to importing. For example, Johnson Controls, an automotive supplier, may choose to produce in Mexico, ship the output back to the U.S., and use that output as an intermediate input in its finished product. This is done instead of just importing the intermediate input. Second, we should be careful about judging the models too harshly since they are, after all, models, and as such they need to distill a complicated reality into a manageable analytic framework.
2 -Result 2. The second result in the paper is closely related to the first. "There is strong evidence of vertical FDI."
Of course there is. The rest of the world calls this "outsourcing." 3 There is a large empirical literature documenting in which countries outsourcing, oops, vertical FDI occurs and in which industries it occurs. Some of the best work here is in fact by Hanson and his co-author Robert Feenstra. Had the BEA data not corroborated what everyone from labor unions to labor economists know is happening, we would not question the received wisdom. We would question what was wrong with the BEA data.
Addressing the evidence on outsourcing using disaggregated data is indeed a contribution of this paper. There are tables suggesting that firms do indeed locate production in low-wage countries when they outsource and that they do so in industries commonly thought to have an unskilled-labor-intensive component to them. These are helpful and informative tables.
-Result 3. The third result of the paper is my favorite. "Even where FDI looks to be horizontal, U.S. multinationals tailor their entry strategies . . . to reflect host-country conditions."
By itself, this is the sort of result that makes economists look bad in the eyes of real world business executives. Of course multinational corporations 288
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(MNCs) do not blindly invest abroad without at least some consideration of the host country. But one of the points that is made here is quite important and I, anyway, have never seen it made elsewhere. Once MNCs set up in the host country, that plant can decide to sell to the local market or can export to another country. Prior to reading this paper, I'd never given much thought to the notion that an MNC produces abroad only to export to a third country. But it makes perfect sense, and the BEA data allow the authors to get an empirical handle on this phenomenon. Furthermore, with the prospect of more regional free trade areas, this strategy is likely to become even more important in the near future. The authors' results as evidenced in tables 3 and 4 are striking and persuasive. The authors are also apparently aware that there are some real issues with their OLS regression in table 5 since there are several disclaimers before any discussion of the results. They note, for example, that "we refrain from commenting on whether the reduced-form specifications used in the literature are the best way to test general-equilibrium trade models." I won't refrain. They are not. But that quibble aside, the ample evidence that economists are wrong to simply assume that when an MNC produces abroad it is for that local market is important and convincing evidence.
-Result 4. The last result is probably my least favorite and not just because it is the hardest to explain. "U.S. parents in manufacturing serve a given foreign market by producing there via an affiliate or by an affiliate that distributes to that market, but not by both."
To fix ideas, General Motors may produce a Chevy in Argentina and export it from Argentina to Brazil. Ford may produce a Focus in Brazil and export it to Argentina. But Ford will not export to Argentina and produce there nor will General Motors export to Brazil and produce in Brazil. Again, I may have missed something here, but this one seems sort of obvious. There absolutely is a point to be made here that foreign affiliates do not always sell locally but may serve as export platforms, but that is Result 3 above. Result 4 is convincing. There are tables of numbers plus the requisite OLS regression. It is less clear to me why this result is as interesting as the others.
These comments have thus far focused on what the authors did do. I have two suggestions based on what they did not do.
At the top of the firm's traditional decision tree is the decision to either serve the foreign market by exporting or to engage in foreign direct investment. This paper is about those firms that do the latter. We learn in great detail many of the unconditional and conditional correlates of FDI. There is perhaps even more to be learned by comparing these firms with those that only export as well as those that both export and engage in FDI. The latter are presumably in the sample, but the former are not. Their inclusion may lead to an even richer understanding of why firms engage in FDI since it will inform us about why some do not.
Lastly, there is something to be learned about why U.S. multinationals engage in FDI by examining where they choose not to invest. While no special mention is made of it in the paper, Africa is a puzzle based on the analysis in the paper. It has low wages, in many cases preferential trade arrangements, is in most cases less far away from the U.S. than parts of Asia, is often English speaking, and yet hosts very, very little FDI. There are lessons to be learned here and this paper steers clear of them.
The BEA data allow a much richer examination of firms' decisions to engage in foreign direct investment than most previous empirical studies have attempted. By using the disaggregated data, the authors produce several (actually, ridiculously many) results. These results are interesting but they do not speak directly to the existing theoretical literature on foreign direct investment since that literature just is not rich enough to accommodate the sorts of heterogeneity that HMS document. While the authors do not come right out and say this, a subtext of their paper is that we need a theory that more readily accommodates the patterns that do emerge in the data. They are right. This paper points the way for future work-both empirical and theoretical. Or better yet, both.
General discussion: Kevin O'Rourke asked whether there was information on how long a company had been operating overseas. During the nineteenth century firms went through clear stages. Even today there might be learning effects that may tip the balance between the various choices firms have to make. Secondly, he wondered how important the EU is to the story about export platforms. It was not clear to him that it would be fair to call Ireland, say, an export platform when it is exporting to the rest of the EU that has a unified trade policy. Peter Morici drew attention to issues that management scholars focus on, such as market structure (do the firms compete in a situation where the product is very homogeneous and there is a lot of pressure on cost?), political stability (can I get my money in and out?), legal systems (are they good, and how do they treat foreign investors?), and incentive structures (how variegated are tax structures and are there significant incentives for exports, such as the maquiladora program in Central America and Mexico?).
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He also wondered when does foreign investment cease to be a foreign investment? With NAFTA is it relevant to talk about what is going on in Mexico and Canada as really foreign? Daniel Tarullo seconded Morici's point by relaying what he has been told by a number of corporate executives over the last few years. They seem to be pursuing corporate strategies where they try to establish themselves as one of the top three, four, or five companies in the world in their product line. Once they get there, they then are going to outsource like crazy, because at that point it is going to be tremendously important to lower costs. There were at least a couple of examples of existing worldwide oligopolies where Tarullo thought one could document that that is in fact what has been happening. He wondered whether the authors' data showed that once you get a certain worldwide concentration, the investment strategies change discontinuously. Dani Rodrik wondered what the relevant benchmark is for saying that there is more vertical FDI than we thought? More than what? Gordon Hanson responded by saying that we have known that vertical FDI and outsourcing happen, but that the sense one gets from the literature is that the horizontal FDI model was somehow right and the vertical FDI model somehow wrong. Econometric tests seemed to provide lots of support for the horizontal model and little support for the vertical model. Such findings have carried a fair amount of weight in the literature, in spite of the fact that we have other types of evidence, including anecdotal evidence, about the presence of vertical FDI. With regard to the econometrics in the paper, he said there were benefits in using an off-the-shelf methodology, in view of the frequency with which the methodology is used these days, and then to caution about interpretation. Matthew Slaughter added that they were hoping to get more information out of some of the firm-level data that are available, to look within the firms as well as learn more about how firms' behavior changes over time. Raymond Mataloni mentioned that they had data for 1977 and 1966 and they could follow up Lawrence's suggestion of looking over a longer time span.
